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Analysis and Fault Tree Analysis methodologies 
applied to civil RPAS systems  
Federica Bonfante1, Matteo Dalla Vedova1* , and Paolo Maggiore1 
1Politecnico di Torino, Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, Corso Duca degli 
Abruzzi no. 24, 10129, Turin, Italy  
Abstract. This paper is on the Failure Modes and Effects and Criticality 
Analysis and Fault Tree Analysis methodologies applied to the equipment 
and functional subsystems of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS). 
Such aerial vehicles have been used almost exclusively for military 
purposes until the first decade of the 2000s. The debate then was focused 
both on technical and regulatory issues and research activities. Thanks to 
this renewed interest on unmanned systems and thanks to relatively recent 
improvements in information science, telecommunication, electronics and 
material science a strong awareness on the potential extension of 
unmanned technologies to civil applications arose up. A variety of 
economic benefits has been recognized by the aviation community from 
the civil use of RPAS, but, due to the absence of the pilot on board both 
military and civilian RPAS have always been relegated to fly into 
segregated airspaces. Technical potentialities of RPAS will be fully 
exploited integrating them into controlled airspaces in a reliable and safe 
way. This paper shows an example of application of FMECA and FTA to 
RPAS and discusses the adequacy and utility of these methodologies to 
study RPAS reliability as well as the possible future developments of this 
work. 
1 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS): the origin and the 
expected future developments  
Since 1944 the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) officially acknowledged 
the existence of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in the Chicago Convention. The 
technical development of RPAS started in the 1950s and is still on going. RPAS were born 
for military purposes with the advantage to relieve the pilot from risks deriving from aerial 
attacks close to the enemy area. More recently thanks to the last improvements in computer 
science, electronics, telecommunications and material science, UAS technology has been 
redirected to civilian applications opening new ways and possibilities for this aeronautical 
new distruptive technology [1]. Expected economic benefits deriving from civilian use of 
RPAS will be achievd accomplishing the full and safe integration of RPAS into controlled 
airspaces.  
Physically, RPAS is composed of the aerial segment (a rotor or fixed wing RPAS or a 
hybrid RPAS fed by hydrogne fuel cell to ehance flight range and endurance), the ground 
segment (represented by a portable radiocontroller or a complete ground control station as 
for the moment it happens for miliatry RPAS), and the Communication, Command and 
Control (C3) radiolink to exchange in uplink/downlink with the aircraft [2].  
This paper is organized as follows: Section 1 introduces RPAS; Section 2 describes the 
FMECA and FTA methodologies applied, the considered RPAS architecture used as basis 
for the analysis and the most significative obtained results; Section 3 sums up the 
conclusions and suggests possible future developments of the present work. 
2 The methodology (FMECA and FTA), the RPAS architecture 
and the results  
The reliability of a system is the probability that it performs its mission for the intended 
period of time under given operating conditions. An unmanned system will be considered 
reliable if it will remain fully operative from the preflight tests/engine start-up phase to the 
duration of the whole mission until landing and engine shutdown [3].  
In this paper an example of application of classical aeronautical reliability analysis 
techniques, FMECA and FTA, is described and discussed with regards to the most critical 
issues.   
The Failure Modes and Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) [4] is an extended 
version of FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis which ranks each potential failure 
mode according to its combination of severity and probability of occurrence [4]. The 
criticality analysis is completed with the evaluation of the most proper solutions/actions 
applicable to  reduce the probability of occurrence of the considered failure mode [4]. The 
FMEA/FMECA allows the analyst to find out single point of failures and collects them in a 
final report draft as per [4] at task 103. The classical FMECA has been applied to an RPAS 
architecture to identify single technical failures; a sort of FMECA process has been applied 
focusing on human factor related to RPAS. Following the Human Factor Analysis and 
Classification System (HFACS) model issued by Prof. James Reason [5], possible errors 
and violations have been identified.  
The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) has been applied to RPAS single 
subsystems/functionalities to find out RPAS combinations of faults capable to lead to the 
loss of a RPAS subsystem/functionality.  
Both FMECA and FTA, that can be executed both in a quantitative and qualitative way, 
have been performed at qualitative level. This approach has been chosen due to the 
assumption that the purpose of the considered work was not to evaluate the punctual 
reliability of an RPAS, but the adequacy and utility of the proposed methodologies to find 
out critical issues in terms of single and multiple RPAS points of failure to successively    
derive from these data useful indications to identify technical hazards typical of RPAS.  
The FMECA has been performed following the Military Standard 1629 Revision A [4]; 
the FTA has been performed according to the Military Handbook 338 Revision B [6]. 
The RPAS architecture used for the analyses and composed from the top to the bottom 
of the aerial segment, the radio link and the ground segment, is represented in Figure 1. 
 
  
 
 
Fig. 1. RPAS architecture [3] 
 
The RPAS subsystems and functionalities have been allocated according to RPAS 
mission phases as shown in Figure 2 [3] and Table 1 [3].  
 
Fig. 4. RPAS flight mission phases [3] 
 
Table 1. RPAS functionalities and mission phases [3] 
RPAS Subsystems Mission phases (Rotor wing RPAS) 
Start-up Subsystem 1, 2 3 4 5 6 7 8, 9 
Structures X X X X X X X 
Propulsion Subsystem X X X X X X X 
Power Subsystem X X X X X X X 
Flight Navigation Subsystem - X X X X X - 
Flight Information Subsystem - X X X X X - 
Flight Control Subsystem - X X X X X - 
Emergency Flight Subsystem - X X X X X - 
Mission Data Subsystem X X X X X X X 
Payload Data Subsystem - - - X - - - 
Communication Command and Control subsystem X X X X X X X 
Ground Control Station subsystem X X X X X X X 
 
The FMECA analysis has been performed considering for every RPAS equipment the 
possible single failure modes. Each failure mode has been coded and described in terms of 
effects (local, higher and next level), mission phase affected (Figure 4 and Table 1), 
severity of consequences ([4] para. 4.4.3), probability of occurrence ([4], Task 102, Para. 
3.1), detectability level ([4], Task 101, Para. 5.1), criticality ranking ([4], Task 102, Figure 
102.2) and possible compensation or mitigation actions ([4], Task 101, Para 5.7).   
The FMECA process analysis on human figures involved into RPAS operations (the 
remote pilot, the pilot on board manned aircraft and the Air Traffic Controller (ATC)) 
mentioned above has been implemented according to the same criteria.  
Among all the RPAS equipment and functionalities studied, FMECA results about 
Automatic Surveillance Dependant – Broadcast (ADS-B) equipment and FTA results on 
Detect and Avoid (DAA) functionality (under Flight Control subsystem) related to ADS-B 
reliability and performance are reported as examples of the performed work. The reason of 
for this choice is that these items play a crucial role for safety in the incoming integration of 
RPAS into controlled airspace besides manned aircraft ([7], [8]). 
Eighteen ADS-B single failures have been identified and considered performing 
FMECA as the most significative ones for RPAS operations.  
Hereinafter some of them are reported as example to succesively focus on the 
discussion of the obtained results.  
Results: ADS-B loss of position accuracy (Probability of occurence: E, Failure 
consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘None’); GPS receiver unit fault 
(Probability of occurrence: E, Failure consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: 
‘None’); ADS-B out antenna deterioration (Probability of occurrence: D, Failure 
consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘None’); ADS-B emitter transponder 
fault (Probability of occurence: E, Failure consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection 
method: ‘None’); erroneous altitude data (Probability of occurence: C, Failure consequence 
level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘None); abrupt interruption of ADS-B service 
(Probability of occurence: B, Failure consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: 
‘Visual or audible warning devices’); loss of satellite integrity signal (Probability of 
occurence: E; Failure consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘Visual or 
audible warning devices’);  sudden delayed aircraft position updates without any 
notification (Probability of occurence: C, failure consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, 
Detection method: ‘Visual or audible warning devices’); sudden loss of ADS-B data to 
ATC controllers (Probability of occurence: D, failure consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, 
Detection method: ‘Visual or audible warning devices’); ADS-B ground station failure 
(Probability of occurence: D, failure consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: 
‘Visual or audible warning devices’); human error (Probability of occurence: D, failure 
consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘None’).  
Table 2 shows the final ADS-B resulting criticality matrix. The severity of the 
considered ADS-B occurrence has always been classified by the Authors as ‘Catastrophic 
(Level I) because unavoidably an ADS-B failure impacts the safety of operation of RPAS 
increasing the risk for mid air collision with other aircraft (manned or unmanned).   
Table 2. ADS-B criticality matrix 
LEVEL A –  
FREQUENT     
LEVEL B – 
REASONABLY 
PROBABLE 
   
Abrupt interruption of ADS-B 
service (NISSA10) 
LEVEL C - 
OCCASIONAL    
Erroneous altitude Data (NISSA7) 
Degradation of data accuracy sent 
by the satellite to the ADS-B 
(NISSA12) 
Sudden delayed aircraft position 
updates without any notification 
(NISSA14) 
Degradation/loss of ADS-B  signal 
(NISSA16) 
Human error (nissa18) 
LEVEL D - REMOTE    
ADS-B OUT antenna 
deterioration(NISSA3) 
Broadcast of distorted data 
(NISSA5) 
Sudden loss of ADS-B data to ATC  
controllers without notification 
(NISSA15) 
ADS-B ground station failure 
(NISSA17) 
LEVEL E – 
EXTREMELY 
UNLIKELY 
   
ADS-B  
loss of position accuracy (NISSA1) 
GPS receiver unit fault (NISSA2) 
Broadcast of incorrect data 
(NISSA4) 
Emitter transponder failure 
(NISSA6) 
Data encoding error (NISSA8) 
Loss of position data to be sent to 
the emitter (NISSA9) 
Abrupt lack of GPS data(NISSA11) 
Loss of satellite signal integrity 
(NISSA13) 
 
 
CATEGORY IV 
- MINOR 
CATEGORY III - 
MARGINAL 
CATEGORY II – 
CRITICAL  
CATEGORY I - 
CATASTROPHIC 
 
 
 
CRITICALITY 
According to [7], the most of failure modes are undetectable from the remote pilot; in 
the other cases visual or audible warning devices can be foreseen for his situational 
awareness. 
Examples of preventive measures are design solutions (redundant equipment) or 
operator actions like regular maintenance and testing of ADS-B avionic equipment.  
On the basis of the performed analysis, redundancy can be suggested for GPS receiver 
using EGNOS (also more reliable than GPS thanks to Receiver Autonomous Integrity 
Monitoring (RAIM) or Fault Detection and Exclusion (FDE) functions) or inertial 
navigation equipment, in particular to compensate in case of abrupt interruption/lack of 
ADS-B service [7].   
Avionics maintenance actions can be suggested to prevent failures due to euipment 
aging like ADS-B out antenna deterioration or altimeter failure,  
As said, the ADS-B failure affects the ‘Detect and Avoid’ functionality ([9], [10]) due 
to the loss of RPAS/aircraft position information. Without the provision of this datum, the 
autoplot autopilot will not receive the input from the DAA to command the RPAS to 
perform the proper evasive manouvers in order to avoid collisions. The combinations of 
events that lead to DAA loss, that is GPS failure, altimeter failure and ADS-B failure have 
been formally addressed implementing a simple DAA fault tree and solving the related 
truth table with three variables. The loss of DAA functionality suggests the potential 
occurrence of hazards like ‘Loss of separation’ and ‘Mid-air collision’. 
3 Discussion and conclusions 
This paper shows an example of application of reliability analysis tecniques to RPAS. 
The obtained results confirm that FMECA and FTA are valuable decisional tools for RPAS 
too while RPAS are now object of great interest and attention from the international 
aviation community.  
This work shows an example of an extended FMECA/FTA evaluation performed on a 
complete RPAS architecture to find out more technical failures. Then these data have been 
evaluated in terms of risk assessment to implement a more comprehensive risk matrix 
including environmental and weather hazards.  
As discussed in Section 2, useful design indications can derive from reasoning about 
reliability of systems both against single and combined failures. Suggestions about when 
and how implementing equipment redundancy or using proper maintenance actions can 
arise from study like the one reported in this paper.  
Another possible extension of the present study, is performing systematic analyses to 
identify the most critical items and issues to focus on when it will be necessary to define  
technical critera for future RPAS airworthiness certification.  
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